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This thesis presents a mathematical model of conducting limited
scale surveillance-interdiction operations in a remote area environ-
ment. The model, which is stochastic in nature, provides CI patrol
schedules in such a manner as to minimize the patrol effort expended,
subject to various resource and operational constraints established by
the local CI commander. Patrol schedules are developed so as to
minimize the ability of the insurgent force to accurately predict future
CI operational plans. In addition to generating patrol schedules, for a
specified patrol plan, the model predicts additional information such
as the expected number of active CI patrols at any given time, the
expected duration of a CI patrol, as well as an estimate of the insur-
gent infiltration rate along a given segment of the infiltration route.
Finally, the model is capable of providing probabilistic statements
concerning the adequacy of a specified force level to satisfy the
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. DISCUSSION OF INFILTRATION
Few, if any, successful insurgent movements have been totally,
or even primarily, internally supported, politically or militarily.
For such a movement to successfully accomplish its objective of
political and social revolution, it is necessary, in particular during
the later, more intensive phases, to receive outside support from
some sponsoring power. Such support, normally in the form of men
and material, is generally infiltrated into the target country covertly
by insurgent forces over a complex system of infiltration routes.
During the early stages of an insurgency, the infiltration effort
is generally limited in scope, since initially, overt insurgent military
operations are necessarily restricted to preclude prematurely alarming
the existing government. In addition, initially a significant percent-
age of insurgent support is obtained from that segment of the local
population sympathetic to the insurgent objectives.
However, as the insurgent movement progresses, reliance
increases on the support infiltrated into the target country. This is
due to increased requirements created by more extensive insurgent
operations, losses of men and supplies to the more active counter-
insurgent operations, as well as a decrease in the amount of support

received from the local population due to increased CI efforts in
population and resource control.
In many insurgent movements, external support is infiltrated to
the insurgent organization from a contigious political sanctuary. By
necessity, the routes along which this infiltration takes place, are
located in terrain which affords maximum security to the infiltra-
tion operation. If the terrain is generally flat, open, and with limited
over-head cover, then the corridors are usually characterized by a
large number of not necessarily well defined infiltration routes,
e. g. , the intricate canal systems of the IV Corps Tactical Zone of
SVN. On the other hand, if the terrain is mountainous, heavily
vegetated with abundant over-head cover, then there are usually only
a limited number of suitable routes available for movement of large
amounts of supplies and men, e. g. , the I CTZ of SVN.
It should be noted, that in general, the CI forces are familiar
only with the location of infiltration corridors, which themselves are
seldom well defined. These corridors consist of numerous individual
trails of various capacities which allow the insurgent great flexibility
in conducting the infiltration effort. The complexity of any infiltration
corridor, will naturally depend on many factors, a few of which were
mentioned above.

B. CONDUCT OF INFILTRATION
In planning and conducting the infiltration program, the insurgent
is interested in affecting the movement of men and material along those
routes which offer the maximum security to the operation. Essentially,
this means along those routes which provide for a minimum probabil-
ity of being detected by the CI force. This implies, that to a degree,
the success with which the insurgent conducts infiltration through an
area may, in part, be expressed as a function of the insurgents knowl-
edge about current and proposed CI surveillance-interdiction opera-
tions. Obviously, the ideal situation from the insurgents point of
view would be to have complete information concerning CI actions
and intentions. This would allow the insurgent to conduct infiltration
operations in those areas void of CI interference, thus reducing the
probability of detection, and hence expected insurgent operational
losses. On the other hand, the worst situation the insurgent could
face, would be that of having no information concerning current and
future CI operations . In this situation, the insurgent would have no
such "reliable" plan upon which to base the infiltration schedule,
and would be forced to allocate the infiltration effort piecemeal
along many routes in hopes of successfully delivering an acceptable
portion of the overall requirement. This last situation represents
a case of "maximum cost" to the insurgent, while providing the CI





Historically, possibly with the exception of the Malayian insur-
gency, it has been demonstrated that stopping infiltration is a very
difficult (if not impossible) and costly task. These interdiction
operations generally include the combined efforts of ground, air, and
if appropriate, water-borne elements. This paper will primarily
restrict itself to the investigation of the ground effort against insur-
gent infiltration, in the area adjacent to the common border between
a contigious political sanctuary and the target country. However, as
will be evident later in this paper, the development could certainly
be translated into the air or water-borne environment. In particular,
this paper will focus on the border surveillance—interdiction effort of
those military /para-military camps deployed along the border des-
cribed above.
The mission of these remote camps is to establish a surveillance
screen along the border, in an effort to develop information concern-
ing insurgent infiltration operations, as well as the conduct of limited
scale offensive ground operations against infiltration when identified.
These offensive operations are deliberately limited in scale and
complexity because of the generally limited capability of the forces
being employed. It might be said that the primary purpose of these
installations is simply to make the infiltration process as costly as
possible to the insurgent.

To accomplish the border surveillance-interdiction mission,
these forces have utilized techniques varying from the stationary
"trail watcher" to the larger, more mobile reconnaissance patrols
which range throughout the camps tactical area of responsibility
(TAOR). The former technique, which relies heavily on small
teams of three to five individuals, positioned along primary infil-
tration routes to report observed activity, is generally employed
only by highly trained, well-equipped military organizations. The
latter technique, which places less demand on individual qualifica-
tions and equipment, is normally employed by the remote camps of
the type addressed in this paper.
The problem faced by the local CI commander is how best to
employ his limited resources so as to (1) maximize the cost of
infiltration to the insurgent, and (2) maximize the amount of useful
intelligence developed by CI ground patrols deployed in the camps
TAOR, subject to various constraints.
D. GENERAL SITUATION
For the purposes of this paper, it will be assumed that the CI
force has been assigned a TAOR contigious with the border of an
adjacent political sanctuary. The CI force has been assigned the




1. the conduct of surveillance of that portion of the border
within its TAOR to develop intelligence concerning insurgent
infiltration operations.
2. the conduct of limited scale ground operations within the
TAOR to interdict insurgent infiltration operations.
Figure 1 illustrates a typical TAOR. It is assumed that the insurgent
has sufficient experience in the operational area to identify the major
trail complexes used by the insurgent for infiltration purposes. Such
a hypothetical trail network appears in the figure. It should be noted,
that the trail system shown in the figure represents but a small seg-
ment of the overall infiltration corridor which this particular camp
has been assigned the mission of surveilling. Adjacent camps are
assigned TAOR's, which accumulatively, span the entire width of
the corridor. Note that the infiltration trails are mutually supporting,
to provide the insurgent with important flexibility in directing the
infiltration operation.
To maintain ground surveillance along the border, as well as
along the existing trails within the TAOR, the CI force commander
conducts ground reconnaissance patrols throughout the operational
area. The number of patrols in the field at any time will necessarily
depend on many factors, including, the size of the TAOR, the strength
of the camp, the nature of the trail complexes, as well as the current














It is assumed that the CI force commander has developed, or has
the capability of developing, a set of patrol routes to be used by the
CI ground operations. Such routes are designed to provide maximum
surveillance coverage to previously identified trails, while allowing
for periodic reconnaissance of other critical areas within the TAOR.
The latter capability allows for the identification of new routes which
may be built by the insurgent, as older routes become too costly to
use. It should be noted, that these patrol routes will not coincide
with existing insurgent trails, but will merely allow for adequate sur-
veillance of activity along these trails.
A hypothetical patrol plan for the assumed TAOR is contained in
Figure 1. It must be realized that periodically, and for many reasons,
the CI commander will re-design the camps patrol plan to account for
changes in the local situation.
E. AN APPROACH TO THE SURVEILLANCE-INTERDICTION
PROBLEM
Assume that a CI force, assigned the border surveillance-
interdiction mission, utilizes the mobile reconnaissance patrol as its
primary vehicle for accomplishing the assigned mission. As stated
earlier, much of the question of surveillance-interdiction may be
reduced to the problem of the CI force precluding the insurgent from
gaining information concerning current and future operations. That
is, if the insurgent is unable to accurately predict the location of
future CI efforts, then the insurgent infiltration process becomes
13

quite risky, and hence costly. It would then appear to be to the CI's
advantage to develop a program which would reduce the insurgents
capability of predicting this information. A scheme which certainly
satisfies this requirement is a "random" patrolling system. Specif-
ically, if the CI patrol schedule, with regards to both time and
location, were truly random, it would be impossible for the insurgent
to predict, based on previous experience, the proposed intentions of
the CI force. While the insurgent is most interested in being able to
predict accurately when and where CI patrols will be at any given time,
the CI commander is interested in denying the insurgent this very
information.
In view of the above, the objective of this paper is to develop a
patrol system which possesses the quality of truly being "as random
as possible" over those areas of primary interest to the CI organiza-
tion. Such a model, possessing this desired random characteristic,




A. INTRODUCTION TO THE MODEL
The basis for the model developed in this paper is taken from
work done by Rosenshine [l], which deals with the theory of patrol
scheduling. The model developed by Rosenshine, which concerned
police patrol scheduling, has been modified for the counter-insurgency
situation.
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE MATHEMATICAL MODEL
The objectives of the model presented in this section are to:
1. determine the appropriate inter-departure times for
patrols dispatched by a CI force.
2. identify the optimal average patrol rates along the various
segments of the patrol route network, and,
3. define the appropriate route to be utilized by a particular
patrol.
These three objectives are to be accomplished in such a manner
as to provide "as random as possible" coverage to those areas of
primary interest to the CI commander.
C. PATROL INTER-DEPARTURE TIMES
In the development of the basic model for this paper, the CI





It is assumed that all route segments in Figure 2. may be traveled
in either direction. In addition, no restriction will be placed on the
equality of the length of the various route segments, either in actual
distance covered, or time required to traverse the segment. It should
be recalled, that the primary objective of the model is to provide for
adequate patrolling throughout the network on as random a basis as
possible. By "as random as possible" is meant, that if an insurgent
was to be stationed at some location in the patrol network recording
the times at which CI patrols passed that location, the insurgents
ability to predict the arrival of the next patrol, based on previous
arrival data which had been collected, would be no better than an
estimate based on no historical data. That is, the insurgents ability
to predict the arrival time of the next patrol would not be improved
16

by prior knowledge concerning previous patrols. More rigorously,
if X. defines the inter-arrival time between the i*" and the (i-l) S
1
patrols, then, "as random as possible" implies:
P(Xn+1 = t/x lf x2 xn)=P(Xn+1 =t)
where P(A) represents the probability that event A occurs. Such a
"memoryless " condition certainly suggests the use of a scheme based
on an exponential distribution.
As an example, assume that the camp patrol plan contained only
one route, which consisted of only one segment. Such a situation is
shown in Figure 3.
O <D
A SIMPLIFIED PATROL NETWORK
Figure 3.
Developing a patrol scheme for the route network described in
Figure 3, which would possess the desired random qualities, could
be accomplished by simply dispatching patrols from \^ with inter
-
departure times determined from an exponential density function:
fT (t) =Le-
Lt for tfcO
where L is the (average) rate at which patrols are dispatched along
the route, and "t" is the time between successive patrols.
Now consider a network with multiple routes and route segments,
such as in Figure 2. Figure 2 is a planar graph, and isomorphic to




AN ISOMORPHIC EQUIVALENCE TO THE PATROL NETWORK
Figure 4.
In the situation described in Figure 4.
,
CI patrols would be dispatched
from the camp, or source, at a rate L =L +L
?
+L.,+L.. The inter-
departure times between patrols, t, would be determined as before
from the probability density function:
fT (t)-LT e-
L T t tfcO
where L and t are defined as above.
D. ARC AVERAGE PATROL RATES
Now suppose that the CI force commander, based on experience
in the operational area, determined that, as a minimum, the izn arc
of the patrol plan must be surveilled at an average rate L!, in order
to accomplish the camp's assigned mission. That is:
L
t
& Li for all i
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In addition, the commander determines the average time, t;, required
for a patrol to traverse the ith arc of the network. The problem then
is to identify the actual rates, L^, which will minimize the total patrol
time expended by the camp, subject to the L{ and t- constraints which
have been established. Utilizing Figures 2 and 4, the problem is to
Minimize
«g"J
L. t- (where n = 16 in Figure 4)
subject to the following constraints:
L. £ L' for all i = 1, 2, 16
1 i
node 1 L +L6 +L 15 _L5 -L l4_L 16 =
node 2 L
?
+L,- +Lg-L^- L-,-Li q =0
node 3 L +L +L, Q-Lg-Lg-L,^ =0
node 4 L4+L9+L l6 -L10-Ln -L 15 =0
node L, +Lp+L~+L, £ La (upper limit for availability of patrols)
node 5 L, • +Li 2^^-J
l?>^~^-''\ a ^ -'
-'a (upper limit for availability of patrols)
Lj +L2 +L«+L4 -L«2 l -L^-^i •? -^1 4. = (equality of source out-
put and sink input)
The solution to the above linear programming problem will identify
the appropriate Li necessary to minimize the overall CI patrol effort
subject to the established constraints [5].
E. ROUTE SELECTION
Having identified the optimal patrol rates along the n assumed
route segments, it is now necessary to determine the actual route to
be utilized by a particular patrol. Specifically, it is necessary to
19

identify those nodes within the network in Figure 4, through which a
given patrol will pass during the conduct of an operation. It must be
remembered that the L.. were established to insure that the scheme
developed would take into account the desires of the commander per-
taining to the frequency with which a particular route segment is
surveilled. Therefore, the procedure selected should in some manner
depend on the relative values of the L.
. That is, assuming that the
patrol has reached node k, the decision as to which arc should be
used when departing k should depend on the relative values of the
rates, L, j=i, 2, m, for all m possible arcs departing node k.
J
If we define P. to be the probability that the J arc is utilized when
departing node k, then,
L i = l,2
,
m




represents a probability distribution function, pdf, for the k node
[2], Obviously each node may possess a unique pdf of the type des-
cribed above. Utilizing this pdf, an appropriate decision may be made
at each node to determine the optimal path to be followed by the patrol
when departing that node.
It should be noted, that the use of a linear program to determine
the optimal patrol rates, a well defined probability density function
to identify patrol inter-departure times, and the above pdf, to deter-
mine the proper sequence of nodes to be visited by patrols, necessitates
20

the use of a computer program to generate large numbers of patrol
schedules.
F. THE EXPECTED NUMBER OF ACTIVE PATROLS AT TIME "T"
Another question of prime importance to the CI commander is
the average number of patrols which will be in the network at some
time t. This information is of great value when planning for main-
tenance, training, or simply establishing troop level requirements.
Recalling that the inter-departure time for patrols is exponentially
distributed, with parameter L™, it follows that the introduction of .
patrols into the network represents a Poisson renewal process. The
number of patrols which enter the network during the time interval





=S Li U 1,2, ;...., m
and there are m different route segments available for use by patrols
when departing the camp, or source. As indicated earlier, in Figure
4, LT =L 1 +L2 +L3 +L4 .
Define XT to be the total number of patrols active in the network
at time T, given that a total of N(T) = n patrols actually entered the
network during the interval (0, T). Therefore, the total probability
law states,





Xi = 1 if the i"1 patrol is still in network at time T.
Xi = o if the i patrol is not in the network at time T.
p = P (the ith patrol is in the network at time T/ that the
i"1 patrol originally entered the network)




and X is a Binoinial random variable with parameters p and n.
Therefore,
/n\ n-k
P(XT =k) =(kj pk(l-p) k=0, 1, ,n
Since N(T) is a Poisson distributed random variable, with parameter
(LT T), then
*22, n k n-k n _L T
P(XT-k)-V_^ (k) p (l-p) CLT T) e T
n=o
n!
k -L -D rr








The steady state distribution for the number of patrols in the network
at time T may be obtained in the following manner. The expected
number of patrols in the system at any point in time is the product
22

of the rate at which patrols are introduced into the network and the
average time a patrol remains in the network. Then,
limit L dT = L E( T )T^ T v s'
T-»co
To evaluate the E( T ), recall that the route determination decision
s
was a stochastic process. Accordingly, the patrol network may be
represented by an imbedded Markov Chain. The source, or camp,
is represented by a reflecting barrier; the sink by an absorbing
barrier. For the patrol network represented in Figure 4, the tran-

























































ithIn Figure 5, the (i, j) n entry represents the probability, P. ., that
*> J
when departing the i node the patrol will proceed to the J node.
Each node in the network represents a state of the Markov Chain, and
f V>
if the j state is not accessible from
\ .=
'
•* the i state





where L. . is the patrol rate between the i and i nodes, and the
sumination in the denominator is over all m routes available for
departing the i node.
Define m- • to be the mean number of transitions till absorption
fV»
at the j state for a Markov Chain which starts in state i. That is,
rrij ; represents the mean number of route-segments traversed by a
patrol during an operation which starts in state i, and terminates in
state j. The following expression for m- • is developed. by Hillier
*» J





Then m in Figure 4, which is the expected number of transitions
o, 5
till absorption at state 5 for the Markov chain in Figure 5, assuming
the system was initially in state 0, may be determined from the
solution to the system of equations generated by the above relationship.
24

If we define t. • to be the average time required to traverse the arc
between the ith and j*-*1 nodes, then
l. . = t.. + y . p. mk j
where m^ • is now the average time required for a patrol to travel
from the ith node to the jth node. In particular, E (T g ) = m^ : for
a patrol starting in state i and terminating in state j may be determined
from a solution to this system of equations.
In view of the above, the steady- state distribution of the number
of patrols in the network at time T may be expressed as





which is a poisson distribution, with parameters L E(T ).
T s
G. APPLICATION OF THE EXPECTED VALUE RELATIONSHIPS
During the planning phase for the establishment of remote
military /para -military installations of the type discussed in this
paper, it is often necessary for the planning staff to identify the
most efficient size force with which to garrison the camp. The model
presented thus far is ideally suited for developing estimates of this
nature.
Assume that the planning staff has selected an initial TAOR to be
occupied by the proposed camp. Based on existing intelligence, the
planners develop an initial patrol network for the area. Estimates are
25

established for the required arc patrol rates, L.!, as well as the
expected time, ti, required to traverse each arc. Based on this
initial representation of the operation, the appropriate L.P problem
is solved to identify the actual arc patrol rates. In addition, the
Markovian relationships discussed in the preceeding paragraph are
utilized to determine E(T
g ). Since it was previously demonstrated
that the number of active patrols in the network is distributed Poisson
with parameter L,pE(T
s





P(XT*K) = 2U (LTE(T S )) J e- LTE(Ts)
If k is defined to represent the number of active patrols which could
be supported by a camp force of a given level, then the probability
that the number of patrols required in the field will not exceed the
availability of patrol effort is defined as above. In this manner,
planners are able to develop force estimates necessary to insure,
for some specified probability level, that an adequate force will be
available to support the proposed operational plan. For a specified
probability level, values of K may be obtained for different combina-
tions of L-T and E(T ). An analysis of how K varies as a function of
the proposed patrol plans, and hence L and E(T ), can be an effective
J. s
aid to the decision maker when selecting the appropriate force level
to be assigned to the TAOR under consideration.
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If on the other hand, assume planners are provided a lower limit
on the acceptable probability, P.
,
of having adequate patrol effort to
support the camp mission, and asked to determine the appropriate
force level for a given patrol network, then, the K, which satisfies,
K -L E(T8 )
P T = > (L E(T )) J eL
J = T s
j!
will represent the required patrol effort. This value may then be
translated into a meaningful force level recommendation.
H. ESTIMATING THE INFILTRATION RATE
A primary mission of the remote military /para -military camp is
to develop meaningful information concerning insurgent infiltration
operations. Among the principal items of interest to the CI force is
the rate at which insurgent forces conduct infiltration through the
assigned TAOR. The model described in this paper provides a means
of developing an approximation for the infiltration rate along given
route segments. This section will describe the approximating pro-
cedure.
Assume that Figure 6 describes the intersection of a CI patrol






CI AND INSURGENT TRAIL INTERSECTION
Figxire 6.




tributed F, for X, and F for X. for all i£ 2 with rate L.. for the i111 i
arc. Insurgent infiltration group inter-arrival times, Y., are dis-
f V>
tributed G for i=l, and G for all i£2, with rate L. for the j route
1
J
segment. Define A to be a region about the trail intersection, in
units of time, beyond which it is impossible for a CI patrol located
at the intersection to identify the presence of an insurgent group on
the trail.
Accordingly, it is assumed that if at least one CI patrol is
located at the trail intersection, while simultaneously at least one
insurgent group is located within the critical zone defined by ^ , then
an engagement between forces will occur with probability 1. It is
28

further assumed that due to the values normally associated with L-, L-
and A , the probability that two or more insurgent elements are within
4\ at any given time is zero, as is the probability of two or more CI
patrols arriving at the trail intersection during any interval A .
The occurrence of engagements between CI and insurgent forces
at the trail intersection forms a stochastic renewal process. A
hypothetical realization of this process, which obviously depends on
the arrival of CI and insurgent elements, appears in Figure 7. It
should be noted that the arrival of CI patrols, as well as the arrival











REALIZATIONS OF STOCHASTIC RENEWAL PROCESSES
Figure 7.
In Figure 7, the ;; indicate the occurrence of a renewal, either
in the form of an arrival or an engagement. If a CI patrol arrives at
the trail intersection at some random time t, and an insurgent
renewal occurs during the interval (t- A/2, t+ A/2), then an engage-
ment occurs with probability 1. As was stated previously,
29

X distributed F, ; X distributed F for n£2
1 * n
Y, distributed G,; Y distributed G for n£2
1 i n
Z. distributed H for all i
1
where Z^ is the time between the itn and (i-l) st engagement.
Define: M (t): the expected number of CI patrols to cross
the trail intersection in any interval of
length t, under a general renewal process
.
M (t): the expected number of insurgent groups to
enter the critical zone during any interval
of length t, under a general renewal process.
M (t): the expected number of engagements to occur
at the trail intersection during any interval of
length t, under a general renewal process.
Obviously then,
M (t)=p M (t)
z x
where p is the probability that a CI patrol crossing the trail inter-
section will become involved in an engagement with an insurgent
element. That is, each CI patrol crossing the trail intersection
represents a Bernoulli trail with the probability of being involved in
an engagement, a success, p. The sum of these Bernoulli random
variables is Binomially distributed with, parameters p and N (t),
Jit
where N (t) is the actual number of CI patrols to cross the trail
intersection during any interval of length t. If N (t) is defined as the
At
actual number of engagements occurring in any interval of length t,
then
N (t)=p N (t)
30





(t)= p M (t)
For this relationship to be of any significance in estimating the para-
meter of the infiltration distribution, it will be necessary to develop
an expression for the Binomial parameter p.
To develop a useful expression for the parameter p, assume that
at some arbitrary time t, a CI patrol reaches the trail intersection
described in Figure 6. The parameter p then is the probability that
this particular patrol will become involved in an engagement with one
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Again, the * represent the arrival of insurgent infiltration
elements. To develop an expression for p, it will be helpful to








where P (t-y) is the probability of an engagement, that is an insurgent
arrival during (t-A/2, t+ A/2), under an ordinary renewal process with
new origin at (t-y). To determine p, it is necessary to uncondition
the conditional probability expression p/Y . That is,
t-A/2 t+A/2




1 (y) + G x (t+A/2) - G^t- A/2) .
where the operator ' : ' now indicates the convolution operation. For
an ordinary renewal process, where G,=G, the above expression
for p is simply,
p = p (t-y)*G(y) + G(t+A/2) -G(t-A/2)
o o ,^
Using the Laplace-Stieltges Transform, G' (s)= I e _s dG(x), [3 ]it
-»
may be shown that,
p*(s) = P*(s) gJ (s) +£ ^G x (t+ A/2)- G^t- A/2); sj
and p*(s)= P*(s) G* (s) +<£ f G(t+ A/2)- G(t-A/2) ; s f
o o *• J
whereJf ) G(t);s 7 , denotes the Laplace-Stieltges Transform operation.
Solving the preceeding two relationships simultaneously results in
the following expression for p'(s).




where M' (s) is the general renewal function for the process defined
by insurgent arrivals, and [3]
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M*(s) = G l (s)
1- G v (s)
Inverting the Laplace-Stieltges Transform, P'(s), to obtain an
expression for p, results in
p = M (t) * [G(t+A/2)_G(t-A/2] + Gjlt+A/Z)- Gj(t-^/2)
t-A/2
=J [G(t+A/2-y) - G(t-A/2-y]dM (y) + G 1 (t+A/2) . G^t-A/2)O
Re -defining the arguments for simplicity as follows,
t +A/2 = t+A
t-A/2 = t
results in
p = f[G(t+A-y)- G(t-y)] dM (y) + G,(t+A) - G (t)
^o ^Y L 1
-f
1
G(t+A-y) dM(y). /G(t.y)dM(y)+ G^t+A) - G,(t)
«?-» y o y
However,
therefore,
M(t) - G^t) + M (t) * G(t) and
M (t) * G(t) - P G(t-y) dM (y)
y o *
P = X G(t+4-y)dM (y) + G (t+ A) - M (t)"^ 7 t+A
M (t+A) - J G(t+£-y)dM (y) - M (t)
t+&y t y y
= J [l.G(t+A-y)] dMy (y)
'/ t+AG(t+A-y) dM (y)
Now, assuming that the patrolling and infiltration processes have been
operating for some extended period of time, the renewal processes
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described may be considered an equilibrium processes. If the arrival




where ? is the rate at which insurgent elements arrive at the trail
intersection [4]. Therefore,




p =/,/G(x)dx = J\TG(x)dx = Fe (A)
where F is the equilibrium distribution for G, the insurgent
inter-arrival distribution. If it is assumed that G is the exponential




-L; Ap=l- e J
Note, the probability of an engagement is dependent on £b , not t.
Returning to the expression M (t)= p M (t), it follows that,
z x
M (t)= F (A) M (t)
z e x
th
However, since the distribution of CI arrivals along the i patrol
route is exponential with parameter L , determined from the solution
i
to the linear programming problem described in II D above, it follows
that
M (t)= L, t
x 1
For large t, M (t), the expected number of engagements at the inter-
section during any interval of length t, converges with the actual
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number of engagements which occur during such a period t. There.
fore, if the actual number of engagements in the time t is used to
estimate M (t), the only unknown remaining in the expression
z
(t)= F (A) M (t) = [ i - e-Lj AKtM
z e x
is the parameter L,
,
the rate of infiltration along the j insurgent
J
infiltration route segment.
It should be noted, that the estimate for JL is very much dependent
j
on the accuracy of the estimate for M (t). The procedure discussed
z
above assumes that a large enough period, t, exists such that the
actual number of engagements which occur will converge with M (t)
and that during this period, the infiltration rate, L., remains essen-
tially unchanged. Certainly, it must be recognized that if a significant
number of engagements occur at the intersection under investigation,
the insurgent may well alter the infiltration schedule which will pos-
sibly alter the appropriate L...
J
In view of the problems discussed in the previous paragraph, as
well as the fact that due to the normal values associated with L-, L-
and A , the actual number of engagements occurring in any reasonable
period t will necessarily be quite small. A result of this situation





The model developed in Section II of this paper represents a
useful mathematical tool which may be of significant practical value
to military staff planners in an Internal Defense and Development
environment. In this section, the objective will be to briefly discuss
some of the various capabilities and limitations of the model.
A. CAPABILITIES
Conditioned on the validity of the assumptions discussed in
Section II, the model developed is capable of the following:
1. Given a CI patrol network and various constraints which
concern the frequency with which network arcs should be patrolled, the
availability of patrol resources, and the conservation of patrol effort
at each node in the network, the model will identify an efficient and
effective patrol schedule for attaining the previously discussed CI
objectives of minimizing patrol effort subject to the above mentioned
constraints, while minimizing the insurgents ability to predict future
CI operational plans.
2. Based on the network and patrol schedule developed in
(1) above, the model is capable of predicting the expected number of
CI patrols active in the network at any time t.
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3. In addition, the model is capable of predicting the expected
duration of a randomly selected CI patrol operating in the network
discussed above.
4. Finally, the model is capable of estimating the rate of
insurgent infiltration along a given infiltration route segment which is
randomly surveilled by CI patrols.
B. LIMITATIONS
The model presented in this paper has been developed based on
various assumptions. Obviously, the validity of any results obtained
with this model is necessarily directly related to the validity of these
assumptions based on the specific situation being investigated. For
that reason, it is felt necessary to direct additional attention to these
key assumptions at this time.
1. With regard to the method of operation attributed to the
CI force, it was assumed that, in view of the nature of the CI forces
under investigation, the mobile reconnaissance patrol was more
appropriate than the previously discussed "trail-watcher" technique.
This assumption was made based on the generally limited capability,
both with respect to training and equipment, of the CI force being
considered in this paper.
2. In developing the CI patrol plan, it was assumed that the
ability of the insurgent to accurately predict future CI operational
plans cculd be minimized through the use of a "memoryless" scheme.
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It must be realized that there are actually several other means by
which insurgent forces can predict such information other than past
performance. Certainly, insurgent security forces located in the
immediate vicinity of the CI camp provide information on the initial
movement of CI patrols departing the camp. In addition, insurgent
trail parties, assigned the task of shadowing CI patrols, are capable
of reporting subsequent patrol movements. Finally, insurgent security
elements stationed along frequently used infiltration routes provide
advance warning to infiltrating groups of the presence of threatening
CI patrols. Such techniques provide the insurgent with essential
information which may have a significant impact on infiltration, and
hence surveillance-interdiction operations. Since CI counter tech-
niques have little effect on such insurgent activities, the model
developed has not considered these aspects.
3. From the discussion in 2. above, it is obvious, that
under certain circumstances the assumption of independence between
the movement of CI patrols and insurgent infiltration elements within
the TAOR may very well be invalid. Such an assumption was necessary
in the development of the estimator for the infiltration rate along a
given infiltration route segment.
38

IV. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The purpose of this section is to briefly describe some additional
problems associated with the counter-insurgency scenario developed
in section I. D of this paper, which are considered appropriate subjects
for mathematical analysis.
A. ALLOCATION OF INTELLIGENCE EFFORT
Essentially, the problem is, given a Tactical Area of Responsibility
(TAOR) such as that defined in Figure 1, with a finite number of possible
insurgent base camp areas, how best to allocate the limited CI intel-
ligence gathering resources (reconnaissance patrols) to maximize the
percentage of the insurgent force located by the CI search effort.
B. CAPTURING AN INSURGENT HEADQUARTERS
The problem is somewhat similar to that described in A above.
However, in this situation the objective is to capture the insurgent
command element, which is normally co- located with a subordinate
unit for security purposes. The problem is to identify the CI optimal
strategy to be used to maximize the probability of capturing the in-
surgent headquarters element. It is assumed that the headquarters
element will be located in each of the various possible base camp
areas with some probability, depending on various factors. In
addition, one must consider the fact that simply concentrating a
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superior force at the proper locations, with adequate surprise, may
not be sufficient to insure the capture of the insurgent headquarters
element. In many circumstances, such an insurgent commander will
use the security force as a decoy, or rear guard, while the command
element escapes from the battle area.
C. THE CHECKPOINT PROBLEM
Assume a CI security checkpoint has been established at some
point along a major trail or road within the assumed TAOR. In
addition to the authorized traffic which passes through this checkpoint,
the insurgent force attempts to use the road for the movement of men,
material and intelligence agents. The CI security force can stop and
check all persons and vehicles passing through the checkpoint, but
only at great expense to the government and inconvenience to the
population. If the CI force were to adopt this policy, the insurgent
would simply by-pass the checkpoint, using some cross-country route,
at some cost to the insurgent (time and increased losses). The prob-
lem then is to identify the optimal search policy to be used by the CI
security force, which will maximize the probability of intercepting
an insurgent element attempting to pass through the checkpoint. Such
a policy must not force the insurgent to adopt the cross-country
alternative to the checkpoint, and must take into consideration resource
constraints which restrict CI policy.
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D. INSURGENT GROWTH MODEL
The objective here is to develop a model which will identify
changes in the level of insurgent activity, as well as changes in
insurgent tactics. It is assumed that the basis of the model would in
some way depend on those political, military, social and economic
factors which form the necessary ingredients for any insurgency.
Given accurate, up-to-date data representing these various factors,
the model should be capable of using this input to determine whether
or not there has been a significant change in the level of insurgent
activity. If such a change is indicated, the model should be capable
of identifying those areas, or factors, vvhich represent primary
insurgent targets. A model capable of detecting and identifying
insurgent trends, directions or intentions would obviously be of great
benefit to a CI force.
E. THE SURVEILLANCE-INTERDICTION PROBLEM
The model developed in Section II of this paper is generally based
on a pessimistic attitude concerning the capabilities of military/
para-military forces of the type normally associated with the remote
camps previously discussed. If on the other hand, one was to develop
a more optimistic attitude, one which reflected a CI capability to
effectively surveil and interdict insurgent lines of communication by
aggressively closing with the enemy in combat, the strategy developed
would most likely differ from that thus far presented. The problem in
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this new situation would be the allocation of limited resources to
effectively impede the flow of men and supplies through a given trail
network. The solution should reflect both the employment of small
scale reconnaissance elements to fix insurgent forces, and the employ-
ment of larger combat forces designed to destroy the infiltration once
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